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ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE. 
By Aryeh Neier. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 
1982. Pp. 265. $17.95. 
Until recently, some issues were never resolved in the courts. Ra-
cial discrimination, capital punishment, and the like were seen as 
exclusively legislative issues, and the judiciary avoided what it con-
sidered unwarranted policymaking of its own. But this era ended 
with Brown v. Board of Education 1 and its progeny, in which the 
Supreme Court unanimously reached out to declare, in effect, an en-
tire social order unconstitutional. Since Brown, advocates of causes 
ranging from mental-health reform to Vietnam War protests have 
turned to litigation as a means of winning battles considered unwin-
nable in the legislatures. 2 
As former National Executive Director of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, Aryeh Neier helped lead the charge to the courts. 
Now he has stepped back from the fray to examine the successes and 
failures of cause litigation from the perspective of a law professor. 
The result is a thought-provoking account in which Neier balances 
his sympathy for the claims of the litigants against his concern that 
some groups are using the courts to achieve results they could not 
have attained through fair competition in the marketplace of ideas. 
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Obtaining judicial review may itself win the battle. For example, even unsuccessful 
challenges to a power plant license can delay completion of the plant for many years and force 
the utility to spend millions of dollars fighting the challenge, to the point where the utility 
decides it will be better off dropping the license application entirely. See pp. 213-16. 
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Neier begins his analysis with "the civics text model of pluralist 
American democracy'' (p. 10), in which each constituency makes it-
self heard at the polls and society's leaders must listen in order to 
remain in power. But special care must be taken to protect the rights 
of those "discrete and insular minorities" unable to protect them-
selves through the political process: the mentally ill or the retarded, 
for example.3 These groups exist apart from the rest of society, 
which is content to warehouse them as cheaply as possible with little 
concern for their well-being. On the other end of the spectrum are 
diverse, more politically influential constituencies such as environ-
mentalists or Vietnam War protesters, which suffer "from no handi-
caps in pursuing their goals through the political process" (p. 152). 
Having fought their battle and lost,4 they should not be given the 
same second chance accorded those unable to fight for themselves, 
argues Neier. Since judicial authority and legitimacy depend largely 
on judicial self-restraint,5 lending the prestige of the courts to these 
challenges diminishes the courts' ability to protect the otherwise 
defenseless. 
Most groups using litigation as a means for social change, how-
ever, fall somewhere between the helpless mental patient and the po-
litically influential environmentalist. As examples, Neier discusses 
litigation in the fields of race discrimination, voting rights, sex dis-
crimination, abortion rights, welfare rights, government secrecy, 
political surveillance, and capital punishment. He critiques the suc-
cesses and failures in each field, often pointing out tactical errors or 
mistaken assumptions that prevented the litigators from achieving 
their goals. One major shortcoming has been a misreading of public 
opinion. Early opponents of capital punis~ent were heartened by 
declining public support for the death penalty and a declining 
number of executions (p. 198), but they failed to press their advan-
tage in the legislatures. Later, public opinion swung back in favor of 
3. The phrase "discrete and insular minorities" originates in Justice Stone's famous dictum 
in United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This dictum has given rise to 
a process theory of constitutional law exemplified in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980). The notion that minorities are protected by participation in a pluralist democratic 
process can be traced to James Madison's political theories. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. 
Madison). 
4. Judicial review of the warmaking power illustrates the courts' increased willingness to . 
hear the claims of those represented in the political process. In Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court deferred entirely to an executive determination of the 
existence of a threat to national security in upholding the internment of tens of thousands of 
Japanese-Americans without any showing of actual danger. By Vietnam, courts were evaluat-
ing the merits of claims that the entire war was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 
317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), qffd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 
(1971); pp. 143-52. 
5. For a detailed treatment of this thesis, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
(1962). But see C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL RE.VIEW IN A DEMOC-
RACY 34-55 (1960) (arguing that judicial legitimacy depends on the Court's active willingness 
to limit the other branches). 
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the death penalty, and states simply replaced invalidated statutes 
with new ones. The litigators were thus left to start over from 
scratch. 
Another shortcoming of cause litigation has been overinclusive-
ness. Advocates often assume that all members of the putatively 
benefitted class desire the benefit, without checking to see if this is 
so. Hence feminists were unprepared to respond when a grassroots 
women's movement led by Phyllis Schlafly blocked passage of the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Overinclusiveness can be even more dan-
gerous in litigation, where one adverse precedent can set back a 
cause for years. For example, a number of convicts facing execution 
have disavowed all efforts to save them, placing the cause litigator in 
the uncomfortable position of arguing against the expressed wishes 
of his client. Not surprisingly, the nine-year moratorium on execu-
tions has ended, and the adverse precedent derived from these cases 
may mean that within the next few years many prisoners who do 
want their sentences commuted are likely to die. 
In Only Judgment, Neier focuses quite narrowly on the role of the 
court in effecting social change. The reader must often rely on his 
own knowledge of the changes in American society to understand 
why the courts have played an assertive role. Neier relates how in-
creased awareness of the inequities of segregation, coupled with 
powerful Southern opposition to civil rights legislation in Congress, 
made Brown v. Board of Education inevitable (pp. 31-33), but he 
does not explain why a society that had ignored mental patients for 
years came to defend their right to treatment. Additional back-
ground information would help the reader understand how and why 
certain groups are perceived as worthy of the special protection of 
the courts while others are not. 
Neier's reassessment of his own role in the growth of advocacy 
litigation illustrates a dilemma faced by many public-interest attor-
neys. They see an injustice and want to correct it as swiftly as possi-
ble. Should they be concerned with abstract propositions of judicial 
restraint? In practice, most cause litigators invite the courts to decide 
all cause-related disputes, trusting the courts to find their own limits. 
Neier's arguments suggest that cause litigators should assume re-
sponsibility for the consequences of turning to the courts to solve all 
of America's ills - including both reduced respect for judicial pro-
nouncements and delayed resolution of all disputes as a result of the 
increased volume of litigation.6 
6. Shortly after Neier stepped down as director of the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
ACLU began a constitutional challenge to draft registration. See CIVIL LIBERTIES, June 1980, 
at I, col. I. Under Neier's analysis this issue is not properly for the courts to resolve, since 
eighteen-year-old males as a class suffer no special political disadvantages. Neier's logic ap-
parently did not persuade his successors. 
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Due to the success of persons like Neier, many Americans have 
come to expect judicial review of any government action as a matter 
of right. This increased reliance on cause litigation has significantly 
affected the way we view our government - and, thanks to decisions 
like Brown, the way we view each other. Only Judgment offers an 
expert insider's perspective on the growth of cause litigation, and 
provides both critics and supporters of judicial activism with much 
to think about. 
